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Independent verification

Don't trust us—verify it yourself.

SatGate Evidence Packs are designed to be checked without SatGate credentials. Fetch the pack and issuer JWKS, canonicalize the signed receipt with RFC 8785 JCS, recompute its SHA-256 hash, verify the Ed25519 signature, and compare unsigned pack mirrors against the signed receipt.

Get verifier toolOpen sample production packDownload sanitized closure

Read the result correctly.

valid=true

With an embedded key, this proves only that the artifact is internally self-consistent. It does not establish who controls the issuer.

trusted_issuer_valid=true

Buyer-verifiable proof requires the signature to validate against a separately fetched or pinned issuer JWKS, with trusted-issuer verification required.

Latest bounded closure record

The July 18 record is sanitized, staging-only evidence. It records strict verifier and trusted-issuer success, verifier-copy parity, restart parity, and containment of historical staging bearer links. It does not authorize production promotion.

Source manifest SHA-256: 62d00ac4bff91e56fea8f5e8e42ceb0bb46461c46ba5d5a8c9645047baba4f5a

Public record SHA-256: 162f523d054feb99c2d65fadad7ecb3aa2d5127f1748160ca97424b73215eb7c

Clean-room verification

python3 -m venv .venv-verify
. .venv-verify/bin/activate
pip install cryptography rfc8785
curl -fsS https://api.satgate.io/v1/evidence/evid_QBBiz-GEI-stsaP6KS01-RL414Csuidv -o pack.json
curl -fsS https://api.satgate.io/.well-known/jwks.json -o jwks.json
python tools/verify_evidence_pack.py pack.json   --jwks-file jwks.json   --require-trusted-issuer

What the verifier checks

  • • Receipt schema version and production/mock markers.
  • • RFC 8785 canonical payload excluding receipt_hash and signature.
  • • SHA-256 receipt_hash and Ed25519 signature.
  • • Issuer JWKS at /.well-known/jwks.json; embedded public keys are fallback evidence, not issuer trust.
  • • Top-level pack mirrors and budget-state mirrors match the signed receipt.
  • • Optional evidence_pack_hash and secret redaction markers.

Current limits

  • • Receipt signing keys are platform-secret-managed; this page does not claim KMS/HSM custody or external assessment.
  • • The evidence archive is durable platform storage, not externally anchored or WORM-assured.
  • • Evidence URLs are bearer-by-ID links. Anyone holding a URL can fetch that Pack until retention or targeted deletion removes it.
  • • Verifier success establishes artifact integrity and issuer anchoring—not upstream behavior, settlement, or regulatory compliance.

What this proves — and what it does not.

Proves

The signed receipt was emitted by the issuer key identified by issuer_kid; signed-field tampering fails; the pack mirrors agree with the signed receipt; bearer/capability secrets are redacted.

Does not prove by itself

Billing settlement, upstream counter reconciliation, MCP or deployment parity, instant revocation propagation, or broad production readiness unless those claims are separately evidenced.